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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case involves an appeal following the issuance of the 
Order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Union, granting Jim Bob Bowman’s motion for summary 
judgment and denying New Union Wildlife Federation’s motion 
for summary judgment.  R. 1.  The district court had proper 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has proper jurisdiction to 
hear appeals from any final decision of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Union.  28 U.S.C § 1291 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does an association have standing to sue for a violation of 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), when its members 
experience an abstract feeling of loss over the alterations 
to a wetland that cannot be seen without trespassing, and 
their concerns about increasing pollution have neither 
been substantiated nor affected their enjoyment of a 
nearby river? 
 
2. Under CWA § 301, does the mere presence of dredged and 
fill material in a wetland constitute an ongoing violation 
of a § 404 limitation, when the language of the statute 
indicates that its violation occurs only with the 
commission of a specific and discrete act? 
 
3. Under CWA § 505(b), will the prior prosecution of a CWA 
violation by a state agency preclude a subsequent citizen 
suit for the same violation when the agency has promptly 
negotiated for immediate compliance as well as valuable 
concessions from the alleged violator? 
 
4. Under CWA § 301, does transferring material within a 
wetland constitute an “addition” of a pollutant, when no 
material is added from outside of the wetland? 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Court is being asked to affirm the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment against appellant New Union Wildlife 
Federation (“NUWF”) on all four of its stated grounds.  NUWF 
commenced the present action against appellee Jim Bob Bowman 
(“Mr. Bowman”) in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Union on August 30, 2011.  R. 3.  NUWF’s citizen 
suit was brought pursuant to § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).  R. 3.  The NUWF complaint alleged 
that Mr. Bowman violated CWA § 301(a) by filling the wetland on 
his property without a § 404 permit.  33 U.S.C. § 1344; R. 3.  
NUWF sought civil penalties and an order requiring Mr. Bowman 
to restore the wetland previously occupying his property.  R. 5.  
New Union Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”), 
having commenced another CWA § 505(a) lawsuit against Mr. 
Bowman twenty days earlier, promptly intervened in the present 
action.  Id.  NUWF also filed motions to intervene in NUDEP’s 
lawsuit and to consolidate the two actions; both of NUWF’s 
motions are pending in the district court.  Id. 
Following discovery, Mr. Bowman and NUWF filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  Mr. Bowman moved for 
summary judgment against NUWF on four separate grounds: (1) 
NUWF lacked standing to sue under the CWA for lack of an 
injury to its members traceable to his actions; (2) the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate NUWF’s citizen suit 
because it alleged a violation that was wholly past; (3) NUWF’s 
citizen suit was barred under CWA § 505(b) because of NUDEP’s 
diligent prosecution; and (4) NUWF failed to establish that he 
caused an “addition” of any pollutants to the wetland.  Id.  
Conversely, NUWF moved for summary judgment against Mr. 
Bowman on the ground that Mr. Bowman had added dredged and 
fill material to navigable waters from a point source without a § 
404 permit.  Id.  At the same time, NUDEP, as intervenor, joined 
Mr. Bowman’s motion on the second (continuing violation) and 
third (diligent prosecution) issues, and opposed his motion on the 
first (standing) and fourth (CWA violation) issues.  Id. 
On June 1, 2012, the district court entered summary 
judgment for Mr. Bowman on all four issues and against NUWF 
on its CWA claim, ruling: (1) NUWF lacked standing; (2) the 
3
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court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Bowman’s actions 
because they were wholly past; (3) NUWF’s lawsuit was barred by 
prior state action; and (4) no violation of the CWA had occurred.  
R. 11.  Following entry of summary judgment, NUWF and 
NUDEP each filed timely notices of appeal before this Court.  R. 
1.  NUWF now takes issue with all four of the district court’s 
rulings, while NUDEP challenges only the first (no standing) and 
fourth (no CWA violation) rulings.  Id.  This Court granted review 
on September 15, 2012.  R. 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 1.  The Bowman Property 
Mr. Bowman owns a thousand-acre property situated along 
the Muddy River near Mudflats, New Union.  R. 3.  The Muddy 
River forms a natural border between the states of New Union 
and Progress, stretching some forty miles above and below the 
Bowman property.  Id.  The River is approximately six feet deep 
and 500 feet wide as it flows past the Bowman property, which 
allows this portion of the river to be used for recreation.  Id. 
Much of the Bowman property is covered by an occasionally 
inundated swamp.  The property is classified as a wetland under 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Wetlands 
Delineation Manual, in part because portions of the property are 
at least partially inundated when the river is high.  R. 3-4.  Until 
2011, the Bowman property remained virtually undeveloped, 
covered with trees and other vegetation typical of a wetland.  R. 
4.  Despite its huge size, only about 650 feet of the property abuts 
the Muddy River.  R. 3.  Nevertheless, the entire property is 
located within the river’s hundred-year flood plain and is 
hydrologically connected to the river.  Id. 
 2.  The Project 
On June 15, 2011, Mr. Bowman set about developing the 
swamp into farmland, on which he hoped to eventually grow 
wheat.  R. 4.  He began by using a bulldozer to cut out trenches, 
knock down trees, and level vegetation.  Id.  The resulting debris 
was pushed into windrows that were at least partially burned 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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and pushed into the trenches.  Id.  The field was then leveled 
with soil from higher areas and redistributed into lower-lying 
areas.  Id.  Finally, Mr. Bowman drained the field by forming a 
wide ditch, or “swale,” running from the back of his property into 
the river.  Id. 
Shortly after work started, NUWF, a local nonprofit 
corporation organized to protect New Union fish and wildlife 
habitats, became aware of Mr. Bowman’s activities.  R. 4.  On 
July 1, 2011, NUWF notified Mr. Bowman of its intent to sue 
under the citizen suit provision of the CWA.  33 U.S.C. § 1365; R. 
4.  A copy of the notice was also sent to NUDEP, the agency in 
charge of implementing the CWA in the State of New Union.  Id.  
The validity of this notice is not contested by either Mr. Bowman 
or NUDEP.  Id.  By July 15, 2011, Mr. Bowman had ceased 
clearing and filling his land.  Id.  Although most of the land had 
been filled, he left the portion of the property along the Muddy 
River untouched.  R. 4.  The property adjacent to the Muddy 
River, and 150 feet inland, remains densely wooded.  Id. 
 3.  Prosecution by NUDEP 
Upon receipt of NUWF’s notice of intent to sue, NUDEP 
contacted Mr. Bowman and informed him that his activities 
violated state and federal law.  R. 4.  Although Mr. Bowman still 
maintains that his activities were not illegal, he promptly entered 
into a settlement agreement with NUDEP.  Id.  Under the terms 
of the agreement, Mr. Bowman agreed not to clear any more 
wetlands.  Id.  He also agreed to convey to NUDEP a 225-foot 
wide conservation easement along the Muddy River, 
incorporating the 150-foot wide unaltered swamp with an 
additional seventy-five-foot wide buffer zone.  Id.  This easement 
will be dedicated to the public for appropriate recreational 
purposes, and Mr. Bowman will create a permanent wetland that 
he will maintain year-round in the buffer zone.  Id.  Once fully 
established, the new partially-inundated wetland will provide an 
even richer wetland habitat than existed before.  R. 6. 
On August 1, 2011, NUDEP incorporated its agreement with 
Mr. Bowman into an administrative order, issued pursuant to 
New Union’s equivalent of § 309 (a) and (g) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(a), (g).  And though the New Union statute would have 
5
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authorized the imposition of $125,000 in civil penalties against 
Mr. Bowman, NUDEP elected to forego penalties in exchange for 
his immediate concessions.  R. 4, 7.  On August 10, 2011, NUDEP 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Union, seeking to have the settlement agreement and 
subsequent administrative order entered as a consent decree 
(“NUDEP Lawsuit”).  R. 5.  NUDEP’s motion for entry of a 
consent decree, unopposed by Mr. Bowman, is currently pending 
before the district court, as is a motion by NUWF to intervene in 
the NUDEP Lawsuit.  R. 5. 
 4.  Attempted Prosecution by NUWF 
On August 30, 2011, NUWF commenced the action presently 
before this Court (“NUWF Lawsuit”).  R. 5.  Like the NUDEP 
Lawsuit, the NUWF Lawsuit also attempts to prosecute Mr. 
Bowman for violating the CWA.  Id.  But, unlike the NUDEP 
Lawsuit, the NUWF Lawsuit seeks the imposition of civil 
penalties against Mr. Bowman, as well as an order that would 
require the removal of all fill material and the restoration of the 
former wetland.  Id.  NUDEP successfully moved to intervene in 
the NUWF Lawsuit shortly after the complaint was filed.  Id. 
NUWF has submitted affidavits from three of its members, 
Dottie Milford, Zeke Norton, and Effie Lawless, attempting to 
establish an injury from Mr. Bowman’s actions.  R. 6.  All three 
member-affiants followed the same basic narrative in their 
testimony.  They each use the Muddy River and its banks near 
the Bowman property for boating, fishing and picnicking.  Id.  
None claim that these activities are affected by Mr. Bowman’s 
project.  Id.  They admit that they are unable to see any changes 
to Mr. Bowman’s property, either from the Muddy River or its 
banks.  Id.  The newly-planted wheat field remains completely 
hidden behind over 150 feet of densely wooded swamp.  Id. 
Nevertheless, the member-affiants insist they “feel a loss” 
over the swamp’s disappearance.  R. 6.  In their opinions, 
wetlands such as the one previously on Mr. Bowman’s property 
provide valuable ecological benefits, which include absorbing 
ambient sediment and pollutants from the river and serving as 
buffer zones during floods.  Id.  Since they cannot see Mr. 
Bowman’s field, they assert their loss stems from the fear that 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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the Muddy River is now more polluted and could become more 
polluted if other nearby landowners also fill their wetlands.  Id.  
Their fears are based only on their opinions and beliefs, and 
NUWF has not offered any corroborating expert testimony.  One 
member, Dottie Milford, testifies that the Muddy River looks 
“more polluted” to her, without further elaboration or 
substantiating evidence.  Id. 
Another member, Zeke Norton testifies that he had “frogged” 
the area for years.  R. 6.  He recalls that the Bowman property 
used to be an especially good area for “frogging,” but now there 
are no frogs in the drained field.  Id.  He claims that he would be 
lucky to find even two or three “good sized frogs” in the wooded 
area.  Id.  Mr. Norton acknowledges that he might have been 
trespassing when he frogged on the Bowman property.  Id.  
Under the terms of Mr. Bowman’s settlement with NUDEP, Mr. 
Norton will now be permitted to legally frog in the wooded area 
and buffer zone, and the area is expected to be an even richer 
habitat for the frogs.  R. 4, 8. 
Fields of wheat, planted in September 2011, now cover the 
entire Bowman property, save the 225-foot easement.  R. 5.  Mr. 
Bowman has no plans to fill or drain the easement or any other 
wetlands.  R. 7.  Construction of the new wetland habitat, 
pending issuance of the consent decree, is estimated to be 
considerably expensive, with maintenance costs as of yet 
unknown.  R. 8. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case concerns the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, which is a question of law.  An appellate court reviews 
the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal 
standard as a district court.  E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 557-58 (1988).  Facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, but only when there is a genuine dispute 
as to those facts.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party is 
unable to show a genuine issue of material fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly granted summary judgment on all 
four issues because: (1) NUWF does not have standing; (2) the 
CWA precludes a citizen suit when a plaintiff alleges only wholly 
past CWA violations; (3) NUWF’s suit is barred by NUDEP’s 
diligent prosecution of Mr. Bowman; and (4) Mr. Bowman’s 
actions did not result in any “addition” of a pollutant under the 
CWA. 
First, NUWF cannot establish standing because it does not 
show that any of its members would have standing to sue in his 
own right.  One member, Zeke Norton, asserts only that his 
enjoyment of “frogging” on Mr. Bowman’s property has been 
impaired—an entirely illegal activity.  Another member, Dottie 
Milford, believes that the Muddy River now “looks more polluted,” 
but fails to specify what she means by such an ambiguous 
comment.  Nevertheless, all three insist that they feel a loss over 
the disappearance of the wetland because they fear it has 
resulted in increased pollution.  Neither they, nor NUWF, 
support these fears with any kind of evidence.  Subjective 
apprehensions such as these do not amount to an injury, 
especially when they clearly have not diminished any aesthetic or 
recreational enjoyment of the Muddy River. 
Even if there were an increase in pollution, it is certainly not 
fairly traceable to Mr. Bowman’s actions.  NUWF does not argue 
that Mr. Bowman has caused pollution.  Instead, it contends that 
other sources, wholly unrelated to Mr. Bowman, caused an 
increase in pollution.  NUWF’s theory is far too attenuated to 
establish causation for standing purposes.  Additionally, it is 
unlikely that NUWF can be redressed by the relief it seeks.  If 
Mr. Bowman’s alleged violation is indeed now wholly past, the 
civil penalties are completely unavailable, and any injury actually 
caused, if any, has already been remedied by NUDEP’s 
administrative order and pending consent decree.  Thus, all three 
elements of standing are not satisfied. 
Second, the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over NUWF’s claim because NUWF fails to allege a 
continuing CWA violation.  Mr. Bowman has ceased all land 
clearing activities and there is no realistic possibility that he will 
resume them again.  Instead, NUWF relies on an imaginative 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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theory that the mere presence of dredged and fill material 
constitutes a continuing violation.  However, this theory 
contradicts the plain language of the CWA, ignores the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, LLC v. Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation, and is unsupported by the authorities that 
NUWF cites.  NUWF alleges nothing more than a continuing 
impact on the environment from a past discharge, which will not 
suffice. 
Third, NUWF’s suit is also barred under CWA § 505(b) 
because NUDEP has commenced a civil action against Mr. 
Bowman for the same violation and is diligently prosecuting that 
action to ensure compliance.  NUDEP’s civil action, filed twenty 
days prior to the present action, is presumed diligent because 
Congress intended the states to be the primary enforcers of the 
CWA.  NUWF cannot meet the heavy burden to overcome this 
presumption because NUDEP has proactively negotiated a 
consent decree that requires Mr. Bowman to cease all CWA 
violations immediately and effectuate environmental benefits at 
considerable costs to Mr. Bowman. 
Fourth, Mr. Bowman’s land-clearing activities do not 
constitute an “addition” of a pollutant under the CWA because he 
merely transferred material from one part of the wetland to 
another.  An “addition” occurs only when a pollutant is first 
introduced into navigable waters from the “outside world.”  This 
definition was recently incorporated into an EPA regulation and 
thus, is entitled to Chevron deference.  When Mr. Bowman’s 
activities are viewed in light of this definition of “addition,” it 
cannot be said that he caused any “addition” of a pollutant into 
navigable waters.  Therefore, summary judgment was proper as 
to all four issues, and this Court should affirm the lower court’s 
decision in its entirety. 
9
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ARGUMENT 
I. NUWF LACKS STANDING BECAUSE IT FAILS 
TO DEMONSTRATE AN INJURY-IN-FACT TO A 
MEMBER THAT IS BOTH FAIRLY TRACEABLE 
TO MR. BOWMAN’S ACTIONS AND CAPABLE 
OF REDRESS. 
NUWF’s suit fails for lack of associational standing.  Citizen 
suits may be expressly authorized by CWA § 505(a), but they do 
not escape the Article III standing requirement.  See Middlesex 
Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 
(1981).  NUWF, an association, cannot establish standing unless 
it initially demonstrates that at least one of its members would 
have standing in his own regard.  Hunt v. Wash. State Apple 
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977) (requiring also 
germaneness to organizational purpose and non-compulsory 
participation of members).  Therefore, at least one NUWF 
member must manifest (1) an actual or imminent injury-in-fact, 
(2) the causation of which is “fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant,” (3) and that redress is “likely, as opposed 
to merely speculative.”  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 
Despite submitting affidavits from three different members, 
NUWF is unable to show injury-in-fact, causation, or 
redressability for any of these individuals.  First, the record 
reveals the absence of any legally cognizable injury.  Second, even 
if NUWF could somehow show an injury, the causation of the 
injury is not fairly traceable to Mr. Bowman.  Finally, the 
redressability requirement is equally unmet because it is unclear 
that the relief NUWF demands would actually remedy the injury 
its members assert.  With none of these three elements met, 
NUWF’s suit must be dismissed, and this Court should affirm the 
district court’s holding that NUWF did not have standing to sue 
Mr. Bowman. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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A.  NUWF Does Not Present an Injury-in-Fact to Its 
Members. 
An injury-in-fact is “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The relevant inquiry concerns injury 
to the member, rather than injury to the environment.  Laidlaw, 
528 U.S. at 181.  Thus, any alleged impact to the environment 
must directly affect the member in a tangible and specifically 
identifiable way.  E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-
35 (1972).  Here, the collective grievances of NUWF members 
may be reduced to three primary allegations: (1) Zeke Norton 
finds fewer frogs on Mr. Bowman’s property; (2) Dottie Milford 
asserts that the river “looks more polluted”; and (3) all three 
member-affiants assert that they “feel a loss from the destruction 
of the wetlands, fearing the Muddy is more polluted . . . and will 
be far more polluted.”  R. 6.  However, none of their claims 
embody a form of legally cognizable harm. 
1. Zeke Norton’s interest in “frogging” on the 
Bowman property is not a legally protected 
interest because trespassing is illegal in New 
Union. 
At the outset, NUWF may assert its member-affiants’ 
interests only in the Muddy River and its banks where they claim 
to boat, fish, and picnic; trespassing on the Bowman property is 
not among its members’ protected interests.  The interests of an 
environmental plaintiff are confined to areas he or she actually 
uses.  See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565-66 (citations 
omitted).  Trespassing, however, is illegal in New Union and is 
not a protected interest.  R. 6.  Accordingly, NUWF cannot 
establish standing based on Zeke Norton’s assertion that he no 
longer finds any frogs on Mr. Bowman’s property.  Mr. Norton 
may very well enjoy “frogging” the whole region, but the only 
diminution in enjoyment that he alleges is occurring when he 
trespasses onto Mr. Bowman’s property.  R. 6.  Whether 
11
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“frogging” for recreation or subsistence, Mr. Norton maintains no 
protected interest in “frogging” when he violates the law to do so. 
2. None of the NUWF member-affiants, including 
Dottie Milford, establish any direct harm to 
their aesthetic or recreational interests in the 
Muddy River. 
To establish an environmental injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a personal aesthetic or recreational value in an 
affected area has been lessened.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 
(citations omitted).  Here, NUWF members have not alleged that 
their recreational interest in the Muddy River has been impaired, 
and have not sufficiently shown that the disappearance of the 
wetland has had any aesthetic impact. 
All three NUWF member-affiants admit that they cannot see 
any changes to Mr. Bowman’s land from the river.  R. 6.  Indeed, 
the affected land remains hidden behind at least 150 feet of 
densely wooded wetland that continues to adjoin the river.  Id.  
Any injury to their aesthetic value in the Muddy River is further 
dispelled when member-affiants do not claim that their 
enjoyment of boating, fishing and picnicking along the Muddy 
River has been impaired by Mr. Bowman’s actions.  Id.  Missing 
facts cannot be presumed to avoid summary judgment.  See Lujan 
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (explaining that 
the standard of review favoring the non-moving party on a 
summary judgment motion cannot support “‘assuming’ that 
general averments embrace the ‘specific facts’ needed to sustain 
the complaint”).  Hence, the member-affiants have established 
only that they continue to enjoy boating, fishing, and picnicking 
as they always have. 
Furthermore, NUWF cannot rely on member-affiant Dottie 
Milford’s vague observation to establish an aesthetic injury.  At 
her deposition, Ms. Milford commented that the Muddy River 
now “looks more polluted to her” than it did before.  R. 6.  But 
without any further specificity, this single unsubstantiated 
statement is not enough.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting that the “mere existence of a scintilla 
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” will not preclude 
summary judgment).  Demonstrating a “distinct and palpable 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4
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injury,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), calls for at 
least some specificity because “aesthetic perceptions are 
necessarily personal and subjective.”  Ecological Rights Found. v. 
Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).  The fact 
that the river’s very namesake suggests its natural turbidity only 
underscores the need for specificity.  Otherwise, an 
environmental plaintiff will be allowed to “replace conclusory 
allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an 
affidavit.”  See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 888. 
3.   The member-affiants’ sense of loss and 
subjective fears of increased pollution do not 
constitute an injury-in-fact because their fears 
are neither realistic nor cause concrete harm. 
NUWF also cannot establish an injury-in-fact based on its 
members’ sense of “loss from the destruction of the wetlands,” or 
their fear that “the Muddy is more polluted as a result and will be 
far more polluted if other adjacent wetlands are cleared and 
drained.”  R. 6.  “[G]eneral emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how 
deeply felt,” will not establish an injury-in-fact.  Humane Soc’y of 
U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, the 
members’ sense of loss by itself is irrelevant.  Moreover, their 
fears are also insufficient. 
First, the member-affiants’ assertions do not establish an 
imminent injury because NUWF members fail to offer any 
realistic basis for their fears.  Standing requires more than just 
the plaintiff’s own subjective apprehensions.  See City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983).  In Lyons, the 
plaintiff lacked standing because he could not show that the harm 
he feared was likely to occur.  Id. at 108.  Similarly, NUWF offers 
no evidence that the disappearance of Mr. Bowman’s wetland is 
actually capable of causing the pollution that its members fear.  
An imminent injury does not arise solely out of conjecture.  See 
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Second, the NUWF member-affiants’ concerns have not 
actually diminished their aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of 
the Muddy River.  Under Laidlaw, a plaintiff’s concerns about the 
effects of a particular discharge will only constitute an injury-in-
fact to the extent that those concerns directly affect their 
13
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aesthetic, recreational, or economic interests.  528 U.S. at 183-84; 
see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 2000) (establishing injury-in-
fact when affiant limited time spent swimming in lake); Pac. 
Lumber, 230 F.3d at 1150 (establishing injury-in-fact when 
affiant refrained from fishing and swimming in creek); Pub. 
Interest Research Grp. of N. J., Inc., v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d. Cir. 1990) (establishing injury-in-fact 
when affiant was discouraged from bird watching on river). 
Even under Laidlaw, fear without any concrete effect is not a 
legally cognizable harm.  See Pollack v. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 
736, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2009).  In Pollack, the court held that the 
plaintiff could not establish standing in part because his fear of 
pollution along Lake Michigan did not affect his recreational 
activities.  Id.  Here too, the NUWF member-affiants do not claim 
that they limit their use of the Muddy River for fear of pollution.  
R. 6.  Again, there is no evidence that member-affiants’ 
recreational enjoyment has been impaired at all.  NUWF might 
argue that Ms. Milford’s fear of pollution has lessened the river’s 
aesthetic value for her in that it “looks more polluted.”  But 
recognizing a purely aesthetic injury from fear is untenable; 
courts will have no means to objectively verify whether the injury 
is genuine.  See David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, 
Environment and Other Contested Terms, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
79, 100 (2004). 
Finally, the injury in Laidlaw arose out of evidence that the 
plaintiffs limited or curtailed their recreational activities on the 
river, knowing it was contaminated with mercury, “an extremely 
toxic pollutant.”  528 U.S. at 176, 183-84.  Had the defendant’s 
discharge been truly harmless, as is the case here, the Court in 
Laidlaw would probably not have reached the same conclusion.  
See Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects 
Probabilistic Standing, But a “Realistic Threat” of Harm Is a 
Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89, 102 (2010).  Therefore, the 
injury-in-fact requirement is not satisfied. 
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B.   Any Pollution in the Muddy River Is Not Fairly 
Traceable to the Challenged Actions of Mr. 
Bowman. 
Standing also requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
causation of his injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”  
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.  The asserted “causal 
connection . . . cannot be too speculative, or rely on conjecture 
about the behavior of other parties. . . .”  Pac. Lumber, 230 F.3d 
at 1152.  Scientific certainty is not required, but a mere 
exceedance of a permitted limit will not suffice.  Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, 913 F.2d at 73 n.10.  Most circuit courts require a 
plaintiff to at least demonstrate that the discharged pollutant 
itself actually “causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries 
alleged. . . .”  Id. at 72; accord Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. 
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1996); Piney 
Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
The NUWF member-affiants assert little more than an 
unsupported belief that the wetland formerly occupying Mr. 
Bowman’s property might have helped to remove some of the 
sediment and pollutants from the Muddy River.  R. 6.  Filling the 
part of the wetland, the affiants speculate, has therefore deprived 
the river of these purported ecological benefits, in turn causing 
the river to become increasingly polluted by other sources wholly 
unrelated to Mr. Bowman’s activities.  Without any firm evidence, 
this sort of attenuated and speculative connection will not confer 
standing.  Moreover, the material allegedly discharged was 
dredged and fill material—not the material that NUWF members 
believe is polluting the Muddy River.  Thus, the causal 
requirement is also not met. 
C.   NUWF Fails to Demonstrate That the Relief It 
Seeks Would Redress Any of the Purported 
Injuries to Its Members. 
NUWF presently seeks civil penalties and an order requiring 
Mr. Bowman to remove the fill material and restore the swamp, 
15
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but even if it could establish an actual injury to its members, 
neither form of relief is appropriate.  There can be no standing for 
relief that extends beyond the actual injury alleged.  Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).  This requirement ensures 
that any relief sought substantially relates to the actual injury it 
would remedy and applies separately to each form of relief 
sought.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185. 
Civil penalties are unavailable to private plaintiffs where the 
violation is wholly past because they have no interest in what 
belongs solely to the public treasury.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).  If Mr. Bowman’s project 
were a violation of the CWA, it is now one wholly past as a matter 
of law.  See infra Part II.  There is no realistic possibility that Mr. 
Bowman might engage in similar conduct in the future.  He is 
already subject to an order from NUDEP in which he is 
prohibited from clearing any more land and required to maintain 
a year-round wetland area along the Muddy River.  R. 4.  The 
decision not to impose civil penalties on Mr. Bowman is well 
within the discretion of NUDEP.  In a situation such as this, “the 
deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties becomes so 
insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen 
standing.”  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186. 
Likewise, an order to restore the swamp is equally 
inappropriate because standing does not exist for harms that 
have already been remedied.  See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 
555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009); accord Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 
(“Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap 
a plaintiff into federal court. . . .”).  For example, in Summers, the 
plaintiff lacked standing to assert an injury that had already 
been remedied by a prior settlement.  555 U.S. at 494.  Here, the 
uncontroverted testimony of NUDEP biologists establishes that 
the new wetland zone will provide far more ecological benefits 
than the former swamp did.  R. 6.  If anything, Mr. Bowman’s 
conveyance of the conservation easement to NUDEP actually 
enhances the aesthetic and recreational interests of the NUWF 
members. 
Standing “assures that ‘there is a real need to exercise the 
power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the 
complaining party.’”  Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (citation omitted).  
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It does not, however, permit a party to petition for relief other 
than what is necessary to redress its injury.  See id. at 494.  
Consequently, NUWF lacks grounds for either form of relief it 
requests, and because NUWF cannot demonstrate that its 
members would have standing, it lacks standing to sue Mr. 
Bowman.  Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER 
NUWF’S CLAIM BECAUSE NUWF ALLEGES A 
WHOLLY PAST VIOLATION OF THE CWA. 
Under CWA § 505(a), a private right of action does not exist 
where the defendant’s violation of the CWA is wholly past.  
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 
49, 64 (1987) (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)).  Unless a plaintiff 
alleges a violation that is ongoing or intermittent, his claim will 
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  Here, 
there is no question that Mr. Bowman’s land-clearing activities 
have ended and will not resume.  Instead, NUWF relies solely on 
an unsupported proposition that the continued presence of 
dredged and fill material on his property amounts to a continuing 
violation of the CWA.  This theory ignores the actual language of 
CWA §§ 301(a) and 404(a), contradicts Gwaltney by focusing on 
the effect of a violation rather than the violating act itself, and 
cannot be supported by precedent.  Mr. Bowman’s discrete actions 
cannot be construed as anything but actions now wholly past.  
Therefore, NUWF’s citizen suit is barred by § 505(a).1 
 
1. In the proceedings below, NUWF relied solely on the theory that the existence 
of dredged and fill material itself constituted the continuing violation.  To the 
extent that NUWF might now try to argue that the draining of the field is a 
CWA violation, that argument is precluded because it was not presented before 
the district court. 
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A.   NUWF’s Theory That the Presence of Fill Material 
Constitutes Its Own Continuing Violation Is 
Inconsistent with the Plain Language of the CWA. 
NUWF’s proposition is facially inconsistent with the plain 
language of the CWA.  In matters of statutory construction, 
courts turn first to the “language of the statute itself.”  Consumer 
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980).  “Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive.”  Id.  Here, § 301(a) establishes the CWA’s general 
prohibition against the unauthorized “discharge of any pollutant.”  
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 
1362(12) (defining “discharge” as “any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source”) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, CWA § 404 prohibits the unpermitted “discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters” so as to bring 
the property into a different use.  Id.  § 1344 (emphasis added); 33 
C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) (2008) (defining “discharge of dredged 
material” as “any addition of dredged material”).  Therefore a 
CWA violation occurs with a “discharge,” defined as “addition.” 
The present-tense use of two action verbs, “discharge” and 
“addition,” is not simply coincidental.  See Sierra Club v. El Paso 
Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[s]ection 
404 emphasizes the ‘activity’ giving rise to the discharge of 
dredged material”).  In fact, subsection (f) of § 404 prohibits only 
the unpermitted discharge of dredged or fill material when it is 
“incidental to any activity.”  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (emphasis 
added).  This means that a permit is only required for the act of 
discharging dredged or fill material.  Thus, a violation of a § 404 
limitation occurs when action is taken and at no other time.  C.f. 
Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 
818 (9th Cir. 2001) (calculating § 404 violations as incurring with 
each action that causes a discharge for purposes of penalty 
calculation).  Furthermore, a violation occurs only when there is 
an “addition” from a point source, which further indicates that fill 
remaining is not a continuing violation because there is no longer 
a point source.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s 
Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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Next, the absence of any provision concerning past 
discharges or discharges that remain is equally significant.  It 
would be entirely improper to infer that Congress’ omission is 
anything but intentional.  For example, Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 7002(a)(1)(B) expressly and 
unequivocally authorizes citizen suits against “any past or present 
generator . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the 
past or present . . . storage . . . or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis 
added).  In the RCRA, it is clear that Congress made the mere 
presence of solid or hazardous waste a continuing violation.  In 
the CWA, it is unmistakable that Congress contemplated that 
individuals might use dredged and fill material to alter the 
character of a navigable body of water, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(f)(2), but chose not to differentiate the manner of violation 
from any discharge.  To imply that the discharge of dredged and 
fill material in a wetland somehow operates outside the scope of 
this scheme is more than the statutory language will permit. 
B.    A Continuing Impact Will Not Substitute for 
Continuing Conduct Under the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Gwaltney. 
NUWF’s “continuing violation” theory incorrectly focuses on 
the consequences of Mr. Bowman’s actions rather than the actual 
conduct giving rise to the alleged violation.  More importantly, it 
is antithetical to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney.  484 
U.S. at 67.  Gwaltney addressed whether citizen-plaintiffs could 
maintain a claim under § 505(a) when the defendant had ceased 
the violating activity—discharging a pollutant in excess of its 
permit.  Id. at 55.  The Court held that citizen-plaintiffs must be 
able to allege in good faith that defendant will again discharge a 
pollutant in excess of its permit (or without a permit) for subject 
matter jurisdiction under § 505(a).  Id. at 67.  In contrast, the 
possibility that some of the pollutants that defendant discharged 
in excess of its permit remained in the nation’s water would not 
suffice.  See id.  The continuance of the violation depends on 
continuance of the violating conduct—not its continuing effects. 
NUWF’s continuing violation theory amounts to nothing 
more than a continuing impact theory.  The continuing impact 
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theory has been argued by plaintiffs when a violator’s past 
discharge continues to have an environmental impact; however, 
this theory has been consistently rejected for allowing a citizen 
suit to proceed.  E.g. Remington Arms, 989 F.2d at 1313 (“The 
present violation requirement of the [CWA] would be completely 
undermined if a violation included the mere decomposition of 
pollutants.”); accord Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 
756 F.2d 392, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1985). 
NUWF might attempt to support its theory by pointing to 
Gwaltney’s concurrence, but this too fails to sustain its argument.  
Justice Scalia contended that the phrase “to be in violation” 
“suggests a state rather than an act,” and that a past violation is 
continuing until the violator has “put in place remedial 
measures.”  484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring).  This does not 
mean what NUWF hopes.  Indeed, Justice Scalia concludes that 
the remedial measures are to “clearly eliminate the cause of the 
violation.”  Id.  Therefore, the concurrence suggests that violators 
should make modifications to the point source to prevent future 
violations.  This is not an issue here.  Mr. Bowman put in place 
remedial measures by removing the point source, the bulldozer, 
which clearly eliminates the cause of the violation. 
NUWF’s attempt to narrow Gwaltney’s reach to only 
violations of CWA § 402 limitations is also fruitless.  In both §§ 
402 and 404, the operative language (“discharge”) remains the 
same—Congress addressed the discharge of two very different 
kinds of pollutants, isolating each into a separate provision, but it 
did not change the language identifying when a permit will be 
required.  Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (requiring a permit for the 
discharge of dredged and fill material for the purpose of changing 
the use of land or interrupting water flow and exempting a list of 
other purposes), and 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (requiring a permit for the 
discharge of pollutants, including dredged spoil and various types 
of fill material per 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)).  Therefore, a violation 
under § 301(a) for either § 402 or § 404 limitations remains the 
same; it requires a discharge.  This indicates that Congress 
contemplated the ways in which the CWA would treat the 
pollutants differently, but the method of violation was not one of 
them. 
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C.    NUWF’s Attempt to Redefine a Violation of the 
CWA Is Unsupported by Precedent and Unjustified 
by Policy. 
NUWF relies on Sasser v. Administrator to support its theory 
that the presence of dredged and fill material can constitute a 
continuing CWA violation.  990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993).  
However, such reliance is misplaced.  Sasser concerned whether 
the EPA could assess civil penalties administratively under a 
then recent amendment of the CWA since the defendant had 
filled his property when the CWA had no provision for civil 
penalties.  Id. at 129.  The court held that the EPA could assess 
penalties because the fill material remained on the property.  Id.  
Beyond the question of retroactive application, this holding is 
unremarkable because there is no question that the EPA can 
assess penalties for past violations—unlike citizen suits.  
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319).  Sasser was 
simply a case of needing to provide the EPA a remedy.  There is 
no basis for extending this principle to a theory that the presence 
of fill material constitutes a continuing violation that will permit 
a citizen suit. 
Likewise, the two district court cases cited by Sasser do not 
support extending its holding beyond the government’s ability to 
assess penalties.  One simply repeats the other, and neither 
involved a citizen suit.  See United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. 
Supp. 684, 700 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States v. Cumberland 
Farms of Conn., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1171 (D. Mass. 1986)).  
Cumberland Farms did not concern subject matter jurisdiction 
either; it only addressed calculation of penalties.  647 F. Supp. at 
1183.  There, the government had obtained a court order against 
the defendant for illegally filling a wetland.  See id. at 1184.  Still, 
the defendant continued to fill, ditch, and grade the wetland, 
violating the court’s order.  Id.  To punish the defendant, the 
district court assessed penalties not only for the days bulldozers 
and backhoes were used, but also for every day that the 
defendant continued to violate the terms of the injunction.  Id. at 
1184–85.  This is entirely consistent with the CWA, which makes 
a violator’s refusal to comply with an injunction a factor in 
penalty calculation.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).  But here, Mr. Bowman 
is not in violation of any court order. 
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Beyond penalty calculation, Sasser’s approach receives little 
support.  E.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 
408 (D. Colo. 1995) rev’d on other grounds 146 F.3d 1241 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (holding lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on 
statute of limitations).  No circuit court has applied the Sasser 
theory in any context.  Moreover, district courts applying Sasser’s 
theory do so based solely on trumped up arguments of policy.  See 
Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 
377-78 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (relying on dicta from N.C.  Wildlife Fed’n 
v. Woodbury, No. 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 
25, 1989)).  Their lines of reasoning have been criticized as 
inconsistent with the CWA’s statutory language and Gwaltney.  
United States v. Rutherford Oil Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 782, 792 
(S.D. Tex. 2010); see also David S. Foster, The Continuing 
Violations Doctrine and the Clean Water Act: Untenable Solutions 
and a Need for Reform, 32 Envtl. L. 717, 736-37 (2002). 
Finding itself without statutory basis or persuasive 
precedent, NUWF also turns to a policy argument.  However, 
there is simply no need for this Court to redefine a violation of the 
§ 404 limitation.  NUWF argues that unless Sasser’s approach is 
adopted, violators will destroy wetlands with impunity, and 
injured parties will be deprived of their day in court.  However, 
this argument ignores the intended role of the citizen suit within 
the CWA’s broader statutory scheme: “to supplement rather than 
to supplant governmental action.”  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.  The 
EPA and the states, unlike private plaintiffs, can still impose 
penalties for past violations.  Id. at 58 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319).  
Hence, the discharging of dredged and fill material into a wetland 
still creates the potential for severe penalties, the penalties 
merely cannot be assessed by private citizens.  Id. 
Moreover, the lack of a private right of action over fill 
remaining in a wetland does not prevent the CWA’s goals from 
being realized.  It is merely a subject that Congress wanted the 
government to have discretion in choosing to remedy as it sees fit.  
Ultimately, this Court need not decide whether or not NUWF’s 
public policy argument is compelling.  “Only Congress may 
change the law in response to policy arguments, courts may not 
do so.”  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 985 F.2d 303, 
304 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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In conclusion, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment because NUWF failed to allege a continuing violation of 
the CWA.  The mere remainder of fill material in Mr. Bowman’s 
swamp cannot constitute a continuous violation under the CWA 
because the violation is contingent on a discrete action.  NUWF’s 
reliance on Sasser is antithetical to the text of the CWA, as well 
as the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Gwaltney.  Therefore, 
this Court should affirm the lower court and hold that NUWF’s 
suit is barred by § 505(a) of the CWA. 
III. NUWF’S CITIZEN SUIT IS BARRED BY CWA § 
505(b) BECAUSE NUDEP IS DILIGENTLY 
PROSECUTING MR. BOWMAN. 
NUWF’s claim is also barred under CWA § 505(b) because of 
NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Mr. Bowman.  The CWA 
authorizes private enforcement only if state and federal agencies 
fail their responsibilities as primary enforcers.  See 33 U.S.C. § 
1365(a)-(b).  Citizen suits occupy a secondary role in CWA 
enforcement by encouraging state action with the statutory notice 
procedure.  Steven C. Anderson, Note, Stop Swinging for the 
Fences!: An Argument for Citizen Intervention in CWA 
Enforcement Actions, 29 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 377, 397 
(2009).  Consequently, whenever a state commences and 
diligently prosecutes civil actions compelling compliance with the 
CWA, any subsequent citizen action will be barred.  Indeed, the 
need for private enforcement has vanished.  33 U.S.C. § 
1365(b)(1)(B); see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.  Private plaintiffs 
may proceed only if they overcome a strong presumption of 
diligence on the part of the state.  N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n 
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991).  Here, 
NUDEP’s action precedes that of NUWF, entitling it to a 
presumption of diligence, and NUWF is unable to show that 
NUDEP’s efforts have been anything but diligent. 
A.   NUDEP’s Prosecution of Mr. Bowman Is Presumed 
Diligent. 
Prosecution of alleged violations of the CWA in the State of 
New Union belongs squarely within the authority of NUDEP.  
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Again, Congress intended for states to be the primary enforcers of 
the CWA.  See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.  Private enforcement 
was merely “meant to supplement rather than to supplant 
government action.”  Id.  For this very reason, courts are 
extremely deferential to states’ prosecutorial discretion and will 
expressly presume diligent enforcement once proceedings have 
been commenced.  Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 
2007); Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557. 
NUDEP, the agency tasked with enforcing the CWA in New 
Union, commenced civil enforcement against Mr. Bowman within 
forty days of receiving NUWF’s notice of intent to sue and over 
twenty days before NUWF filed this lawsuit.  R. 4-5.  NUDEP 
commenced its enforcement in federal district court concerning 
the same violations alleged by NUWF—Mr. Bowman’s land-
clearing activities.  R. 4.  As a direct result of NUDEP’s efforts, 
Mr. Bowman entered into a settlement agreement in which he is 
required to cease all land-clearing activities and convey a 
conservation easement to NUDEP.  Id.  The negotiated 
conveyance includes all of the wooded property adjacent to the 
Muddy River plus an additional seventy-five-foot buffer zone on 
which Mr. Bowman will construct and maintain an artificial 
wetland.  Id.  According to a NUDEP biologist, this “new, year-
round, partially-inundated wetland in the buffer zone will provide 
richer wetland habitat than the former, occasionally-inundated 
wetland presently occupied by the field.”  R. 6.  The settlement, 
subsequently formalized as an administrative order, is now the 
subject of a pending motion for consent decree before the district 
court in NUDEP’s lawsuit, which is unopposed by Mr. Bowman.  
Id.  These actions, all of which predate NUWF’s lawsuit, will be 
presumed diligent as a matter of law. 
B.   NUWF Cannot Rebut the Presumption That 
NUDEP Is Diligently Prosecuting Mr. Bowman. 
NUWF’s lingering discontent is not enough to rebut the 
presumption that NUDEP has prosecuted Mr. Bowman’s alleged 
violations diligently.  Because Congress intended the states to be 
the CWA’s primary enforcers, courts examine their decisions in 
an extremely deferential manner.  E.g., Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.  
Hence, the presumption of diligence places a heavy burden on a 
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prospective plaintiff.  Karr, 475 F.3d at 1198; Piney Run Pres. 
Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008); 
Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.  It is not enough for the plaintiff to 
simply show that the prosecution “is less aggressive than he 
would like” or that the prosecution has resulted in a compromise.  
Piney Run, 523 F.3d at 459; accord Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197; see 
Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 762 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 913 
(2005).  This is because “Congress did not intend for [private 
enforcement] to be even ‘potentially intrusive’” on [the state’s] 
discretion.  Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 
61). 
Generally, courts require only that states’ efforts be “‘capable 
of requiring compliance with the Act and . . . in good faith 
calculated to do so.’”  Piney Run, 523 F.3d at 459 (quoting Friends 
of Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382 F.3d at 760).  Here, NUDEP’s 
negotiated settlement and subsequent administrative order 
requires Mr. Bowman to “immediately cease further violations of 
§ 404.”  R. 7.  It is difficult to imagine what actions could be any 
more targeted at requiring compliance.  Not only have NUDEP’s 
negotiations resulted in the cessation of Mr. Bowman’s land-
clearing, they have also secured additional concessions that 
extend far beyond mere compliance.  In fact, NUDEP compelled 
Mr. Bowman to construct a year-round wetland and convey a 
conservation easement that is dedicated to public use.  Id.  These 
actions are certainly capable of, and calculated to ensure, 
compliance with the CWA. 
This is not a situation where state efforts have proven 
ineffective in ending the defendant’s violations.  In Friends of 
Milwaukee’s Rivers, the state’s prosecution, initiated twenty-five 
years earlier, had resulted in sewerage infrastructure that clearly 
lacked the capacity to prevent subsequent discharges of sewage 
into local waters.  382 F.3d. at 763.  And although a later 
settlement accomplished a reduction in overflow, the sewerage 
district admitted that the changes would not eliminate overflow 
altogether.  Id.  In contrast, NUDEP’s settlement here has 
resulted in the complete cessation of activity alleged to be in 
violation of the CWA, with no realistic possibility of it resuming 
again in the future.  R. 4-5. 
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NUDEP’s prosecution remains diligent, even if it is not as 
sweeping as NUWF would prefer.  See Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197.  
For example, in Karr, the state took action against fewer 
defendants for fewer violations than the citizen-plaintiffs were 
charging in their subsequent lawsuit.  Id. at 1195.  But, because 
the subsequent suit was for “essentially the same violations,” the 
court held that the private plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 
the state’s decisions made its prosecution any less diligent.  Id. at 
1198-1200.  Similarly, NUWF contends that NUDEP’s prior 
prosecution is not diligent because it only seeks to stop Mr. 
Bowman from future violations, whereas NUWF seeks the 
removal of fill remaining on the property and would require the 
former swamp to be restored.  In reality however, NUDEP’s 
actions achieve far more restorative results than NUWF seeks.  
R. 6, 7-8.  NUWF cannot overcome the presumption that NUDEP 
is diligently prosecuting Mr. Bowman simply because it would 
choose a different strategy.  Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197; Piney Run, 
523 F.3d at 459. 
Finally, a decision not to pursue civil penalties or any other 
particular remedy does not reflect a lack of diligence.  See Ark. 
Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).  
The inquiry focuses solely on “whether the State’s action is going 
to bring about compliance.”  Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382 
F.3d at 762; accord Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.  But more 
importantly, allowing citizen suits to proceed where an agency 
elects to forego penalties in favor of imposing costly 
improvements not otherwise required would be harmful to the 
public interest.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.  For example, “[i]f a 
defendant is exposed to a citizen suit whenever the EPA grants it 
a concession, defendants will have little incentive to negotiate 
consent decrees.”  Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197. 
NUDEP declined to impose civil penalties on Mr. Bowman 
because it obtained valuable concessions from him that go further 
than simply bringing about compliance—all at great expense to 
Mr. Bowman.  The cost of constructing the new wetland will be 
considerable, and the future expenses in maintaining it are not 
yet determinable.  R. 8.  Mr. Bowman is also relinquishing all 
agricultural and developmental value in the public-use easement 
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and the maintained wetlands.  Mr. Bowman would not have made 
these concessions if he were still required to pay penalties. 
In conclusion, because NUWF cannot show that NUDEP has 
failed to diligently prosecute Mr. Bowman, NUWF’s citizen suit is 
barred by CWA § 505(b).  Second-guessing NUDEP’s judgment 
will only serve to undermine its broader strategy of enforcement.  
See Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197-98.  NUWF may intervene in 
NUDEP’s lawsuit, but only to protect its own interests.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(b).  Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate, and 
the district court’s order should be affirmed. 
IV. MR. BOWMAN DID NOT VIOLATE THE CWA 
BECAUSE HE DID NOT ADD A POLLUTANT TO 
THE WETLAND. 
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits “the discharge of any 
pollutant” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  The CWA 
defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12).  The term “addition” is undefined under the CWA, but 
is used identically to define discharges under both §§ 402 and 
404.  Therefore, the term must maintain a consistent meaning 
throughout the entire CWA, absent express Congressional intent 
to the contrary.  See Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury of U.S., 475 
U.S. 851, 860 (1986). 
The EPA has consistently relied on the “outside world” theory 
to define “addition.”  E.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 
F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  Under that theory, the “addition” 
of a pollutant from a point source occurs only when the point 
source introduces the pollutant “into navigable water from the 
outside world.”  Id. at 165.  In other words, “[i]f one takes a ladle 
of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the 
pot, one has not added soup or anything else to the pot.”  S. Fla. 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 
110 (2004) (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The EPA incorporated its “outside world” theory into its 
recently promulgated Water Transfers Rule.  40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) 
(2008).  In so doing, the EPA defines “addition” by specifically 
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excluding certain activities from that definition; explicitly 
excluded is the transfer of pollutants within the same body of 
water.  Id.  This EPA interpretation necessarily includes both the 
narrow proposition that “addition” occurs only when a pollutant is 
introduced from the outside world and the broader proposition 
that all waters are considered “unitary waters.”  See generally 
Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 
(11th Cir. 2009).  Although the “unitary waters” theory is itself 
inapplicable here because only one body of water is at issue, the 
Water Transfers Rule’s implicit incorporation of the “outside 
world” definition of “addition” is relevant here.  Because of this 
incorporation, the “outside world” theory’s definition of “addition” 
is entitled to Chevron deference, and when applied here, Mr. 
Bowman’s actions do not constitute an “addition.”  Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the district court and hold that Mr. Bowman 
has not violated CWA § 301(a). 
A.   The “Outside World” Theory Merits Chevron 
Deference Because It Has Been Formally 
Incorporated into the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule. 
The EPA’s definition of “addition” is entitled to Chevron 
deference because it is the agency charged with enforcing and 
guiding the issuance of § 404 permits.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(B); 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984).  Chevron deference requires a court to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation of a statute wherever (1) the statute is 
silent or ambiguous on the precise issue, and (2) the agency’s 
regulatory interpretation of such issue is reasonable.  Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843.  If both elements are met, “a court may not 
substitute its own construction” of the statutory provision, but 
rather, “must give effect to [the] agency’s reasonable 
interpretation.”  Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1219 
(citations omitted). 
First, the meaning of an “addition . . . to navigable waters” is 
entirely ambiguous in the CWA.  The CWA does not define the 
term “addition” anywhere in the statute.  Instead, Congress 
merely dictated that the “discharge of a pollutant” necessarily 
includes an “addition.”  See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).  The general 
purpose of the statute, to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” does not 
provide any further guidance as to what Congress may have 
meant by “discharge of a pollutant.”  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
Congress’ stated purpose is instead extremely “broad and 
ambitious.”  Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1225.  Because the 
issue is ambiguous, it is evident that Congress intended the EPA 
to provide further guidance. 
Second, the EPA’s definition of “addition” in the Water 
Transfers Rule is also reasonable.  Under the Chevron standard, 
“[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill . . . 
[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnote omitted).  Even if 
the court would decide the issue differently, it “may not 
substitute its own construction of a statut[e] . . . for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the . . . agency.”  Id. at 844 (footnote 
omitted).  Therefore, as long as the EPA’s interpretation is 
reasonable, it must be upheld.  Id. 
For example, in Friends of Everglades, the court analyzed the 
Water Transfers Rule in terms of reasonableness.  570 F.3d at 
1228.  In looking at the “unitary waters” portion, the court 
compared the theory to marbles being transferred between two 
buckets.  Id.  As the Eleventh Circuit describes it, although one 
person may say that there are now marbles where there were 
none before (in the other bucket), another person could say that 
there is still the same amount of marbles in buckets.  Id.  The 
court held that the Water Transfers Rule, which necessarily 
includes the “outside world” theory, was certainly not arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute because either 
construction is reasonable.  Id.  Moreover, at least two circuit 
courts have already held that the “outside world” theory was both 
a reasonable interpretation of “addition,” and not inconsistent 
with the purpose or any provisions of the CWA.  E.g., Gorsuch, 
693 F.2d at 183; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
NUWF may argue that this theory is inapplicable because it 
was developed in § 402 litigation, and that the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has promulgated a regulation 
defining “discharge of dredged or fill material” under § 404(g).  
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See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)-(e).  Indeed, the Corps characterized the 
“redeposit” of material into the same body of water as an 
“addition” requiring a permit.  Id. § 323.2 (d)(1)(iii).  However, the 
Corps’ definition of “addition” directly contradicts the EPA’s 
position, thus imposing two diverging meanings of “addition” 
under CWA §§ 402 and 404.  The EPA may very well believe that 
“‘addition’ should be interpreted in accordance with the text of 
more specific sections of the [CWA],” such as §§ 402 and 404.  
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 701 (June 13, 2008).  
Still, its fractured conception of statutory interpretation runs 
counter to the rules of statutory construction and common sense.  
Heidi Hand, Is the EPA’s Unitary Waters Theory All Wet?, 6 Wyo. 
L. Rev. 401, 435-36 (2006) (footnotes omitted).  Absent Congress’ 
express intent to the contrary, a statutory term must carry a 
unitary definition throughout the CWA.  See Sorenson, 475 U.S. 
at 860 (citations omitted).  In other words, one type of activity 
cannot simultaneously constitute an “addition” under § 402, but 
not § 404. 
The EPA, not the Corps, was designated as the primary 
administrator of the CWA.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).  And although 
the Corps is tasked with issuing § 404 permits, “the EPA must 
write the guidelines for the Corps to follow in determining 
whether to permit a discharge. . . .”  Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. 
Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274 (2009).  This 
necessarily means that the EPA is given the final say in what 
actually constitutes an “addition.”  Therefore, to the extent that 
the Corps attempts to regulate the redeposit of material as an 
“addition” under 33 C.F.R. § 323.2, its regulations are invalid. 
Alternatively, NUWF may argue that the EPA’s 
interpretation of “addition” is not entitled to Chevron deference 
because the rule itself does not define “addition,” or even use the 
word.  This theory however, ignores the history of the rule.  Prior 
to the issuance of the rule, EPA produced a memorandum 
entitled Agency Interpretation on Applicability of section 402 of 
the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers, which concluded that 
transfers of water between navigable waters do not constitute an 
“addition.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 33, 699.  In the final regulation, EPA 
concluded that “water transfers, as defined by the rule, do not 
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require NPDES permits because they do not result in the 
‘addition’ of a pollutant.”  Id. (emphasis added).  To ignore the 
rule’s history is to ignore the very reason for its adoption. 
B.   Mr. Bowman’s Actions Do Not Constitute an 
“Addition” Because He Has Not Introduced a 
Pollutant from the “Outside World.” 
NUWF may argue that when Mr. Bowman burned the then-
leveled vegetation, the resulting ash was a new pollutant from 
the “outside world.”  Yet, this argument overlooks how courts 
have historically addressed what is and what is not an “addition.”  
See, e.g., Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175, 183; Consumers Power, 862 
F.2d at 584.  For example, in Gorsuch, the court held that 
pollution caused by a dam did not constitute a discharge of a 
pollutant because the pollutants merely passed through the dam 
and were not introduced to the water from the dam (the point 
source).  693 F.2d at 175.  Likewise, in Consumers Power, the 
court held that a hydro-electric facility that removed and 
returned water containing biological materials from Lake 
Michigan did not constitute an “addition” because the biological 
material remained in the water throughout the entire transfer.  
862 F.2d at 585-86. 
In this case, Mr. Bowman’s activities did not introduce any 
pollutants into the wetland from the “outside world.”  Indeed, all 
of the pollutants were already on the Bowman property when the 
land-clearing commenced.  R. 4.  Despite its movement of 
biological materials within the wetland, the bulldozer added 
nothing to the wetland.  Mr. Bowman simply pushed around 
material already on his property; he did not add any fill material 
collected from any other source.  Id.  Like in Gorsuch and 
Consumers Power, his actions merely passed the pollutant from 
one part of his wetland to another part of the same wetland. 
Any change in form occurring during an activity is also 
immaterial.  See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584.  In 
Consumers Power, the pump-back process had the effect of 
destroying an enormous amount of fish and other life as the 
water passed through the facility’s massive turbines, dumping 
their entrails back into Lake Michigan.  Id. at 582.  Still, the 
court held that this transformation of the biological material—
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live fish to a combination of live and dead fish—did not add a 
pollutant to the lake.  Id. at 585-86.  Because the facility did not 
create the fish and because live fish are “just as much as a 
pollutant” as the mixture, the process did not constitute an 
“addition.”  Id.  In other words, the change in form did not 
matter; the only thing that mattered was whether the material 
was previously in the water.  Id.  Like the defendant in 
Consumers Power, Mr. Bowman did not create the pollutants, but 
merely changed the form of pollutants previously in the wetland, 
and those biological materials (vegetation and soil) are just as 
much a pollutant as the burned ashes.  Undoubtedly, NUWF will 
continue to insist that applying the “outside world” theory to § 
404 permits would render that provision meaningless.  R. 9.  This 
is certainly not the case as fill material typically comes from dry 
land and would still be subject to such permits.  Although 
requiring the materials to come from somewhere outside the 
wetland certainly limits the Corps’ discretion to issue § 404 
permits, it does not render the permit program meaningless. 
Finally, NUWF’s reliance on United States v. Deaton, 209 
F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000), or any other case involving side-casting 
decided prior to promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule, is 
unhelpful.  The Deaton court’s interpretation of “addition” may be 
one reasonable interpretation of “addition,” but so too is the 
agency’s interpretation.  When two reasonable interpretations are 
possible, courts must defer to the one chosen by the agency.  
Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228.  As a result, there was 
no “addition” and thus, “no discharge of a pollutant.”  Therefore, 
no violation of the CWA has occurred.  Summary judgment on 
this ground should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Mr. Bowman should be affirmed. 
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